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Abstract
To test the effectiveness of a drug one can advice two randomly selected groups of
patients to take or not to take it, respectively. It is well-known that the causal effect
cannot be identified if not all patients comply. This holds even when the non-compliers
can be identified afterwards since latent factors like patient’s personality can influence
both his decision and his physical response. However, one can still give bounds on
the effectiveness of the drug depending on the rate of compliance. Remarkably, the
proofs of these bounds given in the literature rely on models that represent all relevant
latent factors (including noise) by hidden classical variables. In strong analogy to the
violation of Bell’s inequality, some of these bounds fail if patient’s behavior is influenced
by latent quantum processes (e.g. in his nervous system). Quantum effects could fake
an increase of the recovery rate by about 13% although the drug would hurt as many
patients as it would help if everyone took it. The other bounds are true even in the
quantum case.
We do not present any realistic model showing this effect, we only point out that the
physics of decision making could be relevant for the causal interpretation of every-day
life statistical data.
1 The problem of noncompliance
in randomized clinical trials
Evaluating statistical data from clinical trials is one of the most applied methods to
investigate the effect of drugs or certain therapies on the patient’s health. To compare
the recovery rate of the patients that have taken the drug to the recovery rate of
the others is among the most popular methods of research in medicine. Despite the
simplicity of this method, it can produce an abundance of misconclusions if it is not
applied carefully. One of the most popular errors in too naive applications of this kind
of statistical reasoning is not to distinguish clearly between so-called experimental and
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non-experimental data. Experimental data is produced if some (randomly selected)
patients are advised to take the drug and some are advised not to take it. In the
second case the patients may decide for their own whether they want to take it or
not. Although one may prefer the second method for ethical reasons, the worth of
the produced data for drawing causal statements is considerably reduced. There is
even no way to prove any causal effects of the drug by those data sets. The reason is
that the possibly observed correlation between recovery rate and taking the drug may
stem from a hidden common cause: There may be an (unobserved) feature of certain
patients that makes them decide to take the drug and at the same time makes them
recover. In the simplest case, this common feature may be a variable that could be
observable in principle. Assume for instance, the elderly people tend less to take the
drug than the younger ones. On the other hand, they recover less likely. This would
produce a correlation that fakes a causal effect of the drug. But this misconclusion
could be avoided by taking into account the patient’s age and evaluating the recovering
rates separately for each age. However, in the generic case, the common cause is less
simple and may even be something that is not accessible at all. Imagine, for instance,
there is something like a strong wish to recover without drugs that is highly correlated
with a high recovery rate. Then the variable describing the common cause is a feature
like personality (including mental and physiological constitution) and we are no able
to quantify it in order to compare only persons with “equal personality”. Randomized
experiments seem to avoid this problem completely. However, there is still a problem
that is directly related to the problem above. In typical tests we cannot expect that all
patients act like they are advised to do: Some may not take it although they should and
some may even acquire it although they were not advised to take it. Assume that it is
even possible to prove (by blood-tests, for instance) that some patients did not comply.
Unfortunately, even this does not solve the problem completely since we cannot identify
which part of the correlations are caused by the common personal feature influencing
the patient’s decision and his recovery behavior and which part of the correlation is
a causal effect of the drug. However, it is clear that the causal effect of the drug
can almost be identified if almost all patients comply since this case approximates
the perfectly randomized experiment. This intuition shows that quantitative lower
and upper bounds on the causal effect of the drug can be given depending on the
compliance rate. This has been investigated thoroughly in the literature (see [1] and
references therein). First we rephrase their most intuitive conclusion. Imagine a naive
researcher, not aware of the non-compliance, observes the two binary variables Z and
Y where Z = z1 or Z = z0 means that the patient had or had not been selected to take
the drug and Y = y1 or Y = y0 means that the patient recovered or not, respectively.
Then he takes the difference between the probability to recover if one was advised to
take the drug minus the probability to recover if one was not advised, i.e.,
P (y1|z1)− P (y1|z0)
as the (positive) causal effect of the drug. 1 Now imagine that a less naive statistician
asks for the maximal error that this naive conclusion can cause. He observes the
1Here we use the large sampling assumption, i.e., the sample size is large enough to estimate the joint
distribution P on all observed random variables. Issues of significance of correlations can therefore be
neglected here.
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variable X where X = x1 or X = x0 means that the patient has or has not taken the
drug, respectively. He concludes that in the worst case of overestimating the effect,
all those that have been advised to take the drug but complied and have recovered,
would have stayed ill if they had complied. On the other hand, all those that had been
advised not to take it and took it nevertheless and did not recover may have recovered
if they would have complied. By this intuition he concludes that the causal effect of
the drug is to increase the probability to recover at least by
P (y1|z1)− P (y1|z0) − P (y1, x0|z1)− P (y0, x1|z0) , (1)
where P (y1, x0|z1) denotes the conditional probability of the event ‘no drug taken and
recovered’, given that the advice was to take it. The other definitions are similarly.
By the same kind of arguments one can give bounds on the underestimation of the
causal effect. One obtains that the recovery rate is increased by at most
P (y1|z1)− P (y1|z0) − P (y0, x0|z1)− P (y1, x1|z0) . (2)
Note that the increase of recovery rate we are talking about is the increase that would
happen if all patients took the drug, also those that have decided not to take it.
Therefore the definition of the causal effect relies on the hypothetical result of an
experiment where all patients are forced to comply.
For a formal proof of statements of this kind one needs a precise model in which
terms as “the recovery rate if all patients take the drug” make sense.
Here we follow the approach of Pearl [1] to formalize causal claims of this kind
within graphical models. Random variablesX1, . . . ,Xn are the nodes of directed acyclic
graphs and an arrow from variable X to Y indicates that there is a causal effect from
X to Y . Furthermore, one has to specify the transition probabilities for each node, i.e.
for each variable Xj one has the conditional probabilities
P (xj |xj1 , . . . , xjk)
where Xj1 , . . . ,Xjk are the parents of Xj . The joint distribution on all the random
variables decomposes into
P (x1, . . . , xn) =
∏
j
P (xj |xj1 , . . . , xjk) .
An essential part of Pearl’s theory is that it distinguishes carefully between the
probability measure that is obtained once one has observed that the variable Xj takes
the value xj and the measure that is obtained if Xj is set to xj by external control.
The first one is the usual conditional probability
P (x1, . . . , xn|xj) ,
whereas he denotes the latter one by
P (x1, . . . , xn| do xj) .
He formalizes this probability by
P (x1, . . . , xn| do xˆj) :=
∏
i 6=j
P (xi|xi1 , . . . , xik)δ(xj , xˆj) .
3
ZX
Y
U
?
Figure 1: Graphical model of causal structure of the compliance problem: Z is the advice to take
the drug, X is patient’s decision to take it, Y is his physical response (recovered or not), and U
represents all relevant latent factors influencing decision and response.
The intuition behind this definition is that the values of Xj do no longer depend on
the values of those variables that influence Xj directly (“the parents of Xj”) or indi-
rectly (“the ancestors of Xj”). Hence the transition probabilities “probability that Xj
takes the value xj, given the value of the parents of Xj” have to be substituted by the
Kronecker symbol. This manipulation, for instance, does not change the probability
distribution of the ancestors of Xj . It changes only the distribution of the descen-
dants of Xj . Whereas conditional probabilities reflect correlations among variables,
the probabilities obtained by the do-operator reflect causal effects and distinguish be-
tween causal directions.
Following [1] the relevant variables in our drug testing problem are X,Y,Z as al-
ready introduced and a latent variable U that includes unobservable features as person-
ality and physical constitution. The graphical model of the causal structure is shown
in Fig. 1.
Whether there is an arrow from X to Y should be clarified by the clinical trial. A
priori, we assume that there is an arrow. Then the model is specified by the following
parameters
P (z), P (x|z, u), P (y|x, u), P (u) .
Whether or not and how P (y|x, u) dependends really on x is not clear yet. The
calculation of P (y| do x) would require to know these parameters, whereas only the
joint distribution on X,Y,Z is observable. But one can find bounds on the so-called
average causal effect [1]
ACE(X → Y ) := P (y1| do x1)− P (y1| do x0) =
∑
u
(
P (y1|x1, u)− P (y1|x0, u)
)
P (u)
(3)
in terms of observable quantities. Above, we have already mentioned one upper and
one lower bound rather informally, namely inequalities (1) and (2). Following [1]
we will call them “natural bounds”. They can formally be proven by the following
considerations. As argued in [2] one can chose U w.l.o.g. such that it can attain
16 = 4×4 possible values and such that U determines X and Y deterministically if the
actual value z of Z is given (compare also [3, 4]). The values of U can be considered
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as a cartesian product of a variable B that determines the patient’s decision X and a
component R that determines Y , i.e., the physical response to the drug,i.e., to recover
of not. The values of the first component are “never take”, “always take”, “comply”
and “non-comply” [5]. Following [6] the response behavior to the drug is given by
“never recover”, “always recover”, “helped”, and “hurt”. We denote these 4 values by
R = r1, R = r2, R = r3, R = r4. In this deterministic model, the only free parameters
remaining are P (z) and P (u). Then the average causal effect is given by the difference
[1]
P (r3)− P (r4) ,
i.e., the probability to recover because of the drug minus the probability not to recover
because of the drug. Counterfactual statements like “the patient would have recov-
ered without using the drug” are subject of philosophical debates with a long history
(see [1]). Therefore it may cause unease to some readers to find causal implications
of data based on such terms. However, Pearl has come up with convincing arguments
(to our opinion) that counterfactual statements do make sense if appropriate mod-
els are available. Provided that one accepts that all variables describing mental and
physiological processes are classical random variables the conclusion that it can be rep-
resented w.l.o.g. by a 16-state variable seems indubitable. However, the assumption
that all mental and physiological states (influencing human decision and health) are
described by classical variables, is not self-evident at all. Here we do not participate
in the (sometimes speculative) debate on the relevance of quantum superposition and
incompatibility of quantum observables for mental processes [7, 8]. We just want to
find out which rules in classical statistics can be violated in case quantum uncertainty
is relevant for mental and physiological processes.
2 The instrumental inequalities
Within the hidden variable model where U can attain 16 different values one can
prove the natural bounds (1) and (2) and even tighter bounds [1]. These so-called
instrumental inequalities read [1]:
ACE ≥


P (y1, x1|z1) + P (y0, x0|z0)− 1
P (y1, x1|z0) + P (y0, x0|z1)− 1
P (y1, x1|z0)− P (y1, x1|z1)− P (y1, x0|z1)− P (y0, x1|z0)− P (y1, x0|z0)
P (y1, x1|z1)− P (y1, x1|z0)− P (y1, x0|z0)− P (y0, x1|z1)− P (y1, x0|z1)
−P (y0, x1|z1)− P (y1, x0|z1)
−P (y0, x1|z0)− P (y1, x0|z0)
P (y0, x0|z1)− P (y0, x1|z1)− P (y1, x0|z1)− P (y0, x1|z0)− P (y0, x0|z0)
P (y0, x0|z0)− P (y0, x1|z0)− P (y1, x0|z0)− P (y0, x1|z1)− P (y0, x0|z1)


Note that the problem to identify the causal effect
P (y1| do x1)− P (y1| do x0) = P (y0| do x0)− P (y0| do x1)
is symmetric with respect to the joint substitution x1 ↔ x0 and y1 ↔ y0. Furthermore
it is symmetric with respect to the substitution z1 ↔ z0 since, abstractly considered,
5
Z is only an arbitrary binary variable that influences the patient’s decision. Note that
perfect non-compliance would also make it possible to identify the effect of the drug.
The 8 inequalities form two groups, namely 1, 2, 5, 6 and 3, 4, 7, 8 such that members
of the same group can be converted into each other by those symmetries.
The upper bounds on the causal effect are given similarly by the substitution y1 ↔
y0 and reversing the signs of all probabilities:
ACE ≤


1− P (y0, x1|z1)− P (y1, x0|z0)
1− P (y0, x1|z0)− P (y1, x0|z1)
−P (y0, x1|z0) + P (y0, x1|z1) + P (y0, x0|z1) + P (y1, x1|z0)− P (y0, x0|z0)
−P (y0, x1|z1) + P (y1, x1|z1) + P (y0, x0|z1) + P (y0, x1|z0)− P (y0, x0|z0)
P (y1, x1|z1) + P (y0, x0|z1)
P (y1, x1|z0) + P (y0, x0|z0)
−P (y1, x0|z1) + P (y1, x1|z1) + P (y0, x0|z1) + P (y1, x1|z0) + P (y1, x0|z0)
−P (y1, x0|z0) + P (y1, x1|z0) + P (y0, x0|z0) + P (y1, x1|z1) + P (y1, x0|z1)


These bounds imply the natural bounds (1) and (2) (for details see [1] and references
therein).
3 Quantum model of latent factors
Here we do not want to discuss the difficult question to what extent quantum me-
chanical effects play a crucial role for mental and physiological processes. However, we
do not want to base causal conclusions from statistical data on the assumption, that
quantum effects are irrelevant in our brain and our body. For doing so, we have to pro-
pose a model that generalizes the model above from classical to quantum probabilities.
We chose the formal setting of algebraic quantum theory which is general enough to
include quantum and classical physical processes.
In this setting, the observable algebra of an arbitrary physical system is described by
a C∗-algebra A (see [9, 10]) containing the unity 1. The algebra A is called the “algebra
of observables”. In a pure quantum system with unrestricted superposition principle
(“without super-selection rules”) A may for instance be the algebra of bounded linear
operators on an arbitrary Hilbert space. An element a ∈ A is positive, written a ≥ 0
if it can be written as a = bb∗. A functional
ρ : A→ C
is called positive if it maps positive elements on non-negative numbers. The states are
positive functionals ρ of norm 1, where the norm is described by
‖ρ‖ := sup
a∈A
|ρ(a)|/‖a‖ = |ρ(1)| ,
and ‖a‖ denotes the operator norm of a. Every yes-no experiment, i.e. an experiment
with two possible outcomes, is described by a positive operator a with a ≤ 1, i.e.,
1−a ≥ 0 and ρ(a) is the probability for the outcome “yes” if the system is in the state
ρ.
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A physical process changing the system’s state can either be described by a completely-
positive map G∗ (“CP-map”) [11] on the set of positive functionals with ‖G∗(ρ)‖ = ‖ρ‖
or, by duality, as CP-map
G : A → A
with G(1) = 1. In this formulation, the process acts on the state by transforming ρ
to G∗(ρ)ρ ◦ G. Measurements with any finite number k of outcomes are described by
so-called positive operator valued measures (“POVMs”), i.e., a family m1,m1, . . . ,mk
of positive operators with
∑
imi = 1. Then ρ(mi) denotes the probability to obtain
the result “i”. Note that the POVM does not describe the effect of the measurement
instrument on the state. If the state after the measurement is relevant, we have to
describe the instrument by a family of k CP-maps G1, . . . , Gk with
∑
iGi(1) = 1. If
the measurement outcome is “i” the state ρ is transformed to ρ˜ with
ρ˜(a) := ρ(Gi(a))/ρ(Gi(1)) ,
where ρ(Gi(1) is the probability to obtain the result “i”. Hence
G1(1), . . . , Gk(1)
is the POVM representing the measurement. Without observing the measurement
outcome, the instrument transforms ρ to ρ ◦G with G :=∑iGi.
The formal setting for investigating the violation of the instrumental inequalities
by quantum latent factors is based on the following assumptions.
1. The advice to take or not to take the drug is perfectly randomized and indepen-
dent of all other factors.
2. All relevant latent factors influencing the patient’s decision and his response be-
havior to the drug are described by the state of a physical system in the sense of
algebraic quantum theory. This state includes the patient’s mental and physical
state as well as noise that influences the decision or response or both. The state
is the state ρ of a physical system (in the sense above) described by an observable
algebra A. The system is either purely quantum, purely classical, or a mixture of
both. Although this may be a too materialistic view on mind and consciousness
this approach is more general than any hidden variable model in the literature.
3. To take or not to take the drug is a classical event that either occurs or does not
occur but there is no quantum superposition between both. The process of human
decision is therefore like a measurement process in its broadest sense explained
above. This instrument is described by CP-maps D1,D0 acting on A. Hence the
state ρ is transformed to ρ ◦D1/‖ρ ◦D1‖ if the patient has decided to take the
drug and ρ ◦D0/‖ρ ◦D0‖ otherwise. If the decision itself is ignored, the process
of decision making is described by the process ρ 7→ ρ ◦D with D := D0 +D1.
4. The advice to take or not to take the drug is a classical signal that influences the
patient’s internal state. The advice to take or not to take transforms the state to
ρ ◦G1 or ρ ◦G0, respectively. Here Gj are CP-maps on A.
5. The effect of the drug is to transform the internal state ρ to ρ ◦ E1, whereas the
natural evolution without drug in the considered time interval changes the state
according to the operation E0. The operations Ej are CP-maps on A.
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6. Whether the patient recovers or not is a classical event and is therefore equiv-
alent to a measurement process in the sense above. It corresponds to a yes-no-
experiment described by a positive operator m ∈ A.
7. The advice to take or not to take the drug has no direct causal influence on the
heath, it influences the probability of recovery only indirectly by influencing the
decision. This corresponds to the fact that the graphical model Fig. 1 for the
classical setting has no arrow from Z to Y .
One may think that it would be more appropriate to assume that the operations
Gj and Ej act on different systems: Gj acts on the mind and Ej on the body. But we
do not want to restrict our proofs to this assumption. In particular, we emphasize that
there may be a part of the body with the property that its quantum state influences
the decision and the recovery. This may, for instance, be a cell that influences the
production of some hormone that has a causal effect on both mood and health.
For the observable quantities we obtain:
P (y1, xk|zj) = ρ(GjDkEk(m)) (4)
is for k = 1 (k = 0) the probability to take (take not) the drug and recover, given that
the advice was to take the drug, i.e. j = 1 (not to take, j = 0). Similarly we have
P (y0, xk|zj) = ρ(GjDkEk(1−m)) . (5)
For causal statements the following unobservable counterfactual probabilities are im-
portant:
ρ(GjDkEl(m))
with k 6= l. It expresses the hypothetical experiment that we observe the patients
decision to take or not to take the drug and prevent him from taking it although he
has decided to or force him to take it although he has refused to. In the following we
use the abbreviation ml := El(m). Assumption 7 translates to the statement
ρ(G1D(ml)) = ρ(G0D(ml)) , (6)
for l = 0, 1.
The increase of the recovery probability that is caused by the drug (ACE) is given
by
ACE = ρ(G1D(m1))− ρ(G1D(m0)) = ρ(G0D(m1))− ρ(G0D(m0)) .
Note that ρ(G1D(m1)) is a sum of the observed probability ρ(G1D1(m1)) and the
counterfactual probability ρ(G1D0(m1)). This reflects the fact that the causal effect
of the drug could only be identified if the taking of the drug was decoupled from the
patient’s decision to take it. In the next section we will present a model violating the
third instrumental inequality. Due to the symmetry of the problem we can violate
inequalities 4, 7, 8 similarly.
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4 Violation of instrumental inequalities and Bell
inequality
The violation of the so-called Bell inequality [12] is one of the most convincing argu-
ments supporting the hypothesis that micro-physics cannot be described by classical
probability theory. The idea behind Bell’s inequality is that it describes quantitatively
the difference between those statistical correlations that appear in quantum theory
and those that can be explained by a classical probability space where all uncertainty
stems from our missing knowledge on the values of some hidden parameters. These
parameters should decide deterministically which event will occur in future. Whereas
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (in the so-called EPR-paradox) gave intuitive arguments
why quantum correlations may behave rather strange, Bell’s inequality formalized a
testable difference between quantum and classical correlations.
As already noted in [1] the instrumental inequalities have some formal analogies
to Bell’s inequality since they give bounds on the possible correlations between two
random variables that are influenced by a common hidden parameter. We took this
“formal analogy” seriously and show that the well-known setting that shows the viola-
tion of Bell’s inequality can be modified to violate the instrumental inequalities 3, 4, 7,
and 8.
We consider a quantum system in C4 and decompose it into C4 = C2 ⊗ C2. The
two basis states of each subsystem can be for instance the horizontal and vertical
polarization of a photon, denoted by |h〉 and |v〉, respectively. The superposition
cos(θ)|h〉+ sin(θ)|v〉
describes a polarization in the direction of an axis with the angle θ with respect to the
horizontal axis. The polarization can be measured by a polarization filter. All photons
that pass the filter are polarized in the direction of the axis of the filter. A photon
with polarization θ has the probability 1/2(1 + cos(2θ − 2θ˜)) to pass the filter if θ˜ is
the direction of the filter’s axis. We write the measurement result “1” if it passes and
“0” if it doesn’t. Then we consider the so-called singlet state
|ψ〉 := 1√
2
(|h〉|v〉 − |v〉|h〉) .
It has the following interesting property: For each filter both results appear with equal
probability. If the polarization axis of filter 1 and filter 2 have the angles α and β,
respectively, the probability that both measurement results coincide is
1
2
(1− cos(2α− 2β)) . (7)
For α = β this means that the results are always different and for α = β ± 90o they
always coincide.
In the typical setting to show that those kind of quantum correlations are funda-
mentally different from classical correlations there is a source emitting a photon pair in
a singlet state in two different directions and the polarization axis of the two filters are
chosen randomly and independently. Bell has shown [12] that there exist angles α0, α1
for the first polarization analyzer and β0, β1 for the second such that the correlations
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(7) cannot be explained by any hidden variable theory that is local. Here locality
means that causal effects between physical systems require physical signals traveling
through the space not faster than the speed of light. Explicitly, Bell’s inequality is as
follows. Assign the values ej = ±1 to the result “photon has passed the filter j” or
“photon has not passed”, respectively. Then define the covariance
C(α, β) :=
∑
e1=±1, e2=±1
e1e1P (e1, e2|α, β) , (8)
where P (.|α, β) describes the joint distribution on the measurement outcomes given
the position of the filters. Then Bell’s inequality states that
|C(α0, β0) + C(α0, β1) + C(α1, β0)− C(α1, β1)| ≤ 2
is satisfied whenever any hidden variable determines both measurement results in ad-
vance, i.e., before one has chosen the filter angles. In contrast, with the singlet state
one can achieve the values ±2√2 if the angles are chosen appropriately. The factor √2
describing the difference between quantum and classical correlations will also appear
in the violation of instrumental inequalities below.
Meanwhile, experiments of this kind [13, 14] have given strong evidence for the
fact that micro-physical effects are really in good agreement with quantum theory
and hence in contradiction to any local hidden variable theory. Since the experiment
above is one of those that cannot be explained by any local hidden variable model
it is straightforward to use this setting to construct a causal toy model for patient’s
decision and his physical response that violates the instrumental inequalities. Let the
left polarization filter initially have the angle α0. The advice to take the drug turns the
filter to the angle α1. The result of the left polarization measurement is the patient’s
decision. The right filter is initially in the position β0. The drug turns the filter to
the position β1. The measurement of the right photon decides whether the patient
recovers. This is shown in Fig. 2
In this setting the decisive conditional probabilities are given by
P (yj, xk|zl) = 1
4
(
1− (−1)j+k cos(2αl − 2βk)
)
.
This can be seen as follows: The indices l (advice to take/ not to take) and k (taken
or not) determine the angles α and β of the filters. The probability that the patient’s
decision (0 or 1) coincides with his response to the drug (0 or 1) is given by (1 −
cos(2αl−2βk)/2. The probabilitiy that the results disagree is (1+cos(2αl−2βk)/2. The
probabilities for the results 1 and 0 in the first measurement are 1/2 each, regardless
of the measurement angle. This gives an additional factor 1/2. Here we will not
really need the general setting using CP-maps as described in Section 3. In order to
show, that the experiment described above fits in the general formalism we shortly give
the definitions of the CP-maps Gj ,Dk, El in an informal way. The maps G0 and G1
describe the turning of the first filter by the angle α0 or α1, respectively. D0 and D1
describe the operations on the system caused by a vertical polarization measurement
if the result is negative or positive, respectively. E0 and E1 correspond to the filter
rotations by the angles β0 and β1, respectively. The yes-no experiment that is given
by polarization a measurement of the second photon (with respect to the vertical
10
advice turns
the angle
drug turns the angle
measurement outcome =
measurement outcome =
recovered or not
EPR-pair
patient’s decision
identifying the causal effect
requires to decouple patient’s decision
from the taking of the drug
filter 1 filter 2
Figure 2: Unrealistic toy model of human behavior. The process of decision making and the
process determining the physical response to the drug are influenced by a common quantum state.
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axis) is described by the operator m. Hence the operators E0(m) and E1(m) describe
polarization measurements with angles β0 and β1, respectively. Let P
α
1 and be the
projector onto the subspace of C2 spanned by
cosα|h〉+ sinα|v〉
and Pα0 be the projector onto the orthogonal subspace. Then Gj ◦Dk is the CP-map
a 7→ (Pαjk ⊗ 1) a (P
αj
k ⊗ 1) .
Here we have assumed for simplicity that the polarizator is not a filter that absorbs
some photons and let the others pass but we assume that is splits the photon beam into
those with vertical and those with horizontal polarization. Otherwise the operation D0
would be more difficult to describe formally since it annihilates the photon completely.
The positive operators mj = Ej(m) are given by
El(m) = 1⊗ P βl1 .
By applying the CP maps Gj and Dj to ml we obtain
GjDk(ml) = P
αj
k ⊗ P βl1 .
Due to
P
αj
1
+ P
αj
0
= 1
we have
G0D(ml) = G1D(ml) = 1⊗ P βl1 .
This shows that equation (6) is satisfied.
It is almost obvious, that the average effect of the drug is zero since in both filter
positions the probability to pass is 1/2. If we would decouple the taking from the
patient’s decision the recovery probability was in both cases 1/2 whether the drug was
taken or not.
This does not mean that the drug does not have any causal effect on the patient’s
health at all: The drug might help the patients that have decided to take it and could
hurt the others if they had been forced to take it. Hence the effect is only zero in the
average for a hypothetical experiment where all patients are forced to take the drug,
even those that would have decided against it. Since we have already argued that the
average causal effect is zero, the third instrumental inequality is violated if we find
polarizator positions α, β, γ, δ such that
P (y1, x1|z0)− P (y1, x1|z1)− P (y1, x0|z1)− P (y0, x1|z0)− P (y1, x0|z0) > 0 . (9)
For doing so, we show that we can chose the angles such that
P (y1, x1|z0) = 1/4(1 + 1/
√
2) =: a+
and all the other four terms should be
1/4(1 − 1/
√
2) =: a− .
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The equation P (y1, x1|z0) = a+ is satisfied if
α0 − β1 = 90o ± 22, 5o .
By setting
α1 − β1 = ±22, 5o
we achieve that P (y1, x1|z1) = a−. With
α1 − β0 = 90o ± 22, 5o
we have P (y1, x0|z1) = a−. By
α0 − β1 = 90o ± 22, 5o
we obtain P (y0, x1|z0) = a−. By
α0 − β0 = 90o ± 22, 5o
we achieve P (y1, x0|z0) = a−. All these equations can be satisfied if
β1 = 0
o, α0 = 67, 5
o, β0 = −45o, α1 = 22, 5o .
Then the left hand side of inequality (9) is
a+ − 4a− = 1/4(−3 + 5/
√
2) ≈ 0.134 .
Hence the third instrumental inequality claims the average causal effect to be about
13% although it is zero. Note that in this setting it was essential that there is indeed
a causal effect of the drug on the recovery - sometimes negative and sometime positive
depending on the patient’s decision. Hence the conclusion that the drug influences
patient’s health is true nevertheless.
However, we present a modified version of the Gedankenexperiment where every
classical statistician should come to the conclusion that there is a causal effect although
the drug does not influence health at all. This version is even more analogue to the
violation of Bell’s inequality, actually it is just a reinterpretation of it. Assume as
above that some randomly selected patients are advised to take or not to take a drug,
respectively. Not everyone complies but we can identify the non-compliers afterwards.
After waiting for a while some of the patients (randomly selected) are given another
drug. Since it is given in the presence of the doctor, we exclude the possibility of
noncompliance here. Then we observe which patients have recovered. We describe the
experiment by 4 observed binary random variables X,Y,Z,W , where X,Y,Z are as
in Section 1 and W is the taking of the second drug. As in Section 1 the there is a
latent variable U that influences decision and recovery behavior. The complete causal
structure is given by the graphical model in Fig. 3.
Whether or not there is an arrow from X to Y should be clarified by statistical
data.
Now we consider once more the singlet states and assume that the advice to take the
drug turns the filter position from α0 to α1. As above, the result of the measurement
at the left filter is the patient’s decision. In contrast to the setting above, the taking
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U?
Z
X
Y
W
Figure 3: Graphical model of causal structure between the advice to take the first drug (Z), the
taking of it (X), the taking of the second drug (W ), and the recovery (Y ). The hidden variable U
represents all relevant latent factors influencing decision and recovery.
of the drug does not have any effect on the second filter. The second filter is turned
from angle β0 to β1 by the second drug. With the definition of eq. (8) the singlet state
can produce a joint measure on the outcomes such that
C(α0, β0) + C(α1, β0) + C(α0, β1)− C(α1, β0) = ±2
√
2 ,
for appropriate polarizator angles αj and βj . In analogy to Bell’s original argument,
this value for the sum of covariances cannot be explained by any classical variable U
in the graphical causal model of Fig. 3 if there is no causal effect from X to Y . The
classical statistician should therefore come to the erroneous conclusion that there must
be a causal effect from the first drug on the recovery.
Admittedly, we do not know of any example, where classical statistics draw causal
conclusions based on Bell’s inequality. However, we want to point out that causal
conclusions based on classical probability theory may even fail if the physiological
and mental processes that are decisive for human behavior are sensitive to quantum
noise. It is not necessary that the mental and physiological processes themselves are
non-classical.
5 Some instrumental inequalities are still valid
We will prove that the group 1, 2, 5, 6 of instrumental inequalities is still valid in the
quantum setting of Section 3. Due to the symmetry of the problem it is sufficient to
prove only the first one given by
ACE ≥ P (y1, x1|z1) + P (y0, x0|z0)− 1 .
It can be shown using simple operator inequalities. We have to show that
ρ(G1D(m1))− ρ(G1D(m0)) ≥ ρ(G1D1(m1)) + ρ(G0D0(1−m0))− 1 . (10)
We show this by simple calculations with operators. Note that
G0D1(1−m0) ≥ 0 , (11)
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since 1−m0 is a positive operator. The reason is that 1−m is positive and 1−m0 =
1 − E0(m) = E0(1 − m) is positive because it is obtained by the application of the
CP-map E0 on 1−m. Similarly, the application of the CP-maps D1 and G0 conserve
positivity. By the same arguments, G1D0(m1) is positive. Hence we obtain
G0D1(1−m0) +G1D0(m1) ≥ 0 . (12)
Inequality (12) is equivalent to
G0D0(m0) +G0D0(1−m0) +G0D1(1−m0) +G1D0(m1) ≥ G0D0(1)
Using D0 +D1 = D we obtain
G0D0(m0) +G0D(1−m0) +G1D0(m1) ≥ G0D0(1) .
This is equivalent to
G0D0(m0) +G1D(1) +G1D0(m1) ≥ G0D0(1) +G1D(m0) .
By G1D(1) = 1 we obtain
G0D0(m0) + 1+G1D0(m1) +G1D1(m1) ≥ G0D0(1) +G1D(m0) +G1D1(m1) ,
and
G1D(m1)−G1D(m0) ≥ G1D1(m1) +G0D0(1−m0)− 1 .
Applying the state ρ to both sides, we obtain inequality (10). The second, fifth,
and sixth instrumental inequality follow similarly due to the two symmetries of the
problem according to the substitution z1 ↔ z0 (corresponding to the substitution
G1 ↔ G0) and a common substitution x1 ↔ x0, y1 ↔ y0. Note that the substitution
y1 ↔ y0 corresponds to the substitution mj ↔ 1−mj and x0 ↔ x1 to the substitutions
D0 ↔ D1 and m1 ↔ m0. Hence the second symmetry corresponds to the operator
substitutions D1 ↔ D0 and m1 ↔ 1−m0.
The same techniques can be used to prove the more intuitive natural bound (1)
ACE ≥ P (y1|z1)− P (y1|z0) − P (y1, x0|z1)− P (y0, x1|z0 . (13)
Note that the probability P (y1|z1) is given by ρ(G1D1(m1)+G1D0(m0)) and P (y1|z0)
is given by ρ(G0D1(m1) +G0D0(m0)). The probabilities that appear as the third and
the fourth term in (13) can be obtained from eq. (4) and eq. (5).
We show that the operator inequality corresponding to inequality (1) is true which
reads
G1D(m1)−G1D(m0) ≥
G1D1(m1) +G1D0(m0)−G0D0(m0)−G0D1(m1)−G1D0(m0)−G0D1(1−m1) .
Due to G1D(m0) = G0D(m0) this is equivalent (by some elementary calculations) to
G1D0(m1) +G0D1(1−m0) ≥ 0 ,
which is certainly true. Hence the most intuitive bound, which is probably the best
known one, cannot be violated by quantum effects. This is another interesting result.
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6 No large-scale entanglement required
The EPR-setting above suggested that the violation of the instrumental inequalities
requires large-scale entanglement between the part of the brain where the decision is
made and the part of the body where the disease is located. We emphasize that large-
scale entanglement of this kind is not necessary. Consider two nervous cells, one sending
a signal to any endocrine gland that produces a hormone that supports the recovery
process and the other one that sends signals to the central nervous system and influence
human decisions. We assume that the output of both cells is a classical signal but its
internal state cannot completely described by classical variables. Hence the internal
process that decides whether the cell sends a signal or not is a quantum measurement
process. Then our setting requires that both cells share an entangled quantum state and
that their input signals operate on the corresponding internal quantum system. Our
considerations show that entanglement between two cells may even produce interesting
effects. Such an entangled state may for instance be provided by quantum correlated
noise influencing both cells. Note that the EPR-pair provided by the noise may even
be “one-particle-entanglement”, i.e., a particle being in a superposition of ariving at
one cell and ariving at the other.
Nevertheless we do not want to speculate whether such models may be realistic. It
is not really plausible that quantum noise influencing a small number of cells would
produce correlations like in our toy model. One may also object that there is a large
period of time between the decision and the response to the drug. Hence the violation
of the instrumental inequalities requires quantum coherence that is stable for a long
time (compared to time scales of decoherence in technical quantum systems). Therefore
the violation seems to be even less likely.
However, the main purpose of this paper was to show that some classical causal
interpretations of every-day life statistical data could in principle fail if latent quantum
effects influence our behavior.
Thanks to Pawel Wocjan for useful corrections.
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